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What Is the 
> 
For more than a decade now, retailers have been under 
pressure f rom the courts and from legislatures to reduce 
f inance charge rates and to mod i fy the methods used to 
calculate such charges. 
The most recent wave of pressure can be traced to an 
increasing reliance on the " revo lv ing" charge a c c o u n t -
where in new purchases are added to the balance, the re-
quired payment is a funct ion of the open balance, and a 
f inance or service charge is assessed based on the balance. 
A m o n g other reasons, the increasing use of this type of 
account has tended to highl ight the revenues that a retailer 
receives for extending credit. Also, since the revolving 
accounts have f requent ly replaced a 30-day charge ac-
count, the in t roduct ion of a finance charge led some 
observers to believe that an apparently free service had 
been replaced by a revenue-generating one. Retailers, they 
bel ieved, were reaping addit ional profits by "se l l ing" a 
service they used to give away. 
Dur ing hearings held by the National Counci l on Con-
sumer Finance dur ing 1970, and dur ing hearings held by 
Senator Wi l l i am Proxmire at approximately the same t ime, • 
another not ion concerning these accounts was in t roduced: 
that the nature of the revolving account discr iminated • 
against certain groups of consumers either by making them 
pay more than others for goods and services or by denying 1 
them credit privileges granted to others. 
A comprehensive study was recently conducted by 1 
Touche Ross for the New York State Counci l of Retail 
Merchants (available f rom the Counci l at 150 State St., 
Albany, N.Y. 12207). The study demonstrated several key 
points: 
— The retailer, despite highly visible and apparently sub- , 
stantial revenues, earns no prof i t on the "sale of credit 
services"—in fact he incurs a substantial loss. ( 
— Contrary to what many wel l - in tent ioned people believe, 
the present situation discriminates against cash cus-
tomers rather than against credit users; this is so because 
regulations fail to permit the operat ion of a free market > 
for credit services. 
— The obvious and most popular solutions for the law- » 
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makers—reducing service charge cei l ings and manda t ing 
certain assessment methods—do not solve, and in fact 
may exacerbate the p rob lem. 
The Touche Ross study, comp le ted in September, 1973, 
invo lved 17 New York State retailers and 1,700 of their re-
vo lv ing credi t customers. These retailers together realize 
we l l over 50 percent o f the revo lv ing cred i t sales in New 
York State. They represent a comprehens ive sample o f 
pr ivate, pub l ic , and chain stores w h i c h operate in met ro-
po l i tan or upstate areas, or both. Some stores use the 
previous balance m e t h o d of f inance charge assessment 
and some the adjusted balance me thod . 
Because of the s igni f icance of this sample and its scope, 
the study is p robab ly the most comprehens ive one yet to 
be made of the economics of retail c red i t operat ions. 
It inc ludes: 
— Cost analysis of the c red i t func t ions of each retai ler, 
iden t i f y ing the costs associated w i t h revolv ing cred i t 
revenues. 
— A revolv ing cred i t u t i l i za t ion analysis that ident i f ies the 
po r t i on of revo lv ing cred i t account holders w h o ut i l ize 
the revolv ing feature and thereby pay f inance charges 
for ex tend ing the i r repayment periods. 
— Simula t ion of the impac t that a l ternat ive f inance charge 
assessment methods and rates w o u l d have on store 
f inance charge revenue. 
The results of the Touche Ross revenue and cost analysis 
for 17 New York State retailers are summar ized as fo l l ows : 
Revenue/Cost Percent 
$(000) 
Revolv ing Cred i t Sales $776,454 100.0% 
Finance Charge Revenue 59,034 7.6 
Cred i t Costs 87,875 11.3 
Def i c i t on Cred i t Ope ra t i on . . . $ (28,841) (3.7)% 
As the summary shows, costs are substant ial ly in excess 
of revenue, in fact nearly 50 percent greater than revenue. 
Continued 
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ECONOMICS OF NEW YORK STATE RETAIL STORE REVOLVING CREDIT OPERATIONS 
Revolving Credit Revenue and Cost Analysis 
Amount 
$(000) Percent Store type 
Net Revolving Cred i t Sales (excluding 
finance charge revenue) 
Finance Charge Revenue (net) (1) 
$776,453,5 100.00% 
Private 
100,00% 
Metro-
politan 
100.00% 
Upstate 
100.00% 
Chain 
100.00% 
Public 
100.00% 
59,033.9 7,60 7,78 7.71 2.97 8.11 3.13 
Credi t Costs: 
Personnel costs: 
,50 .68 .39 .40 .41 .24 
Account servicing 8,060.9 1.04 1.49 .72 1.43 .70 1.15 
Account col lect ion 3,2659 .42 .65 .27 .32 .26 .33 
Addi t ional sales personnel .13 .16 .11 .14 .10 .15 
Support ing services 866,8 .11 .19 .06 .19 .03 .26 
Management 376.7 .05 .09 .03 .02 .02 
Data processing 1,941.2 .25 .14 .33 .13 ,34 .14 
Total personnel costs 19,424.9 2.50 3.40 1.91 2.61 1.86 2.29 
Data processing equipment 1,261.0 .16 .19 .15 .07 .16 .06 
Credit investigation 1,075,8 .14 .18 .11 .18 .11 .14 
Bad debt losses 10,853.5 1.40 ,83 1.81 .72 1.93 ,58 
Col lect ion agency fees 1,329.1 .17 ,11 ,21 .18 .22 .12 
Credit space and equipment 1,555.4 .20 .25 .15 .58 .15 .27 
Postage 3,078.0 .40 .45 .36 .37 .36 .34 
Communicat ion 1,161.5 .15 .29 ,06 ,12 ,04 .22 
Supplies and other 3,602.5 .46 .34 .54 .42 .57 .35 
Cost of capital 44,533.6 5.73 4.23 6.83 3,72 6.93 5.02 
Total credit costs 
Excess/(deficiency) of revenue over costs . 
87,875.3 11.31 10.27 12.13 8.97 12,33 9.39 
$(28,841.4) (3.71)% (2.49)% (4.42)% (6.00)% (4.22)% (6.26)% 
—Exhibit III of louche Ross study 
(A more detai led breakdown of costs for the sample ap-
pears above.) 
The methodo logy used in isolating revolving credit costs 
and revenues is designed to count only the "ext ra" costs 
and to om i t all elements of cost attr ibutable to both cash 
and other forms of credit sales. Many of these procedures 
were reviewed and approved in concept by the National 
Commission on Consumer Finance, wh ich was created by 
an act of Congress. If anything, the procedures tend to 
understate rather than overstate costs, and therefore the 
def ic i t on credit operations is real and represents an actual 
" ou t -o f -pocke t " deficit . 
The def ic i t on revolving credit does not imply that the 
retailers w o u l d be better off w i thou t revolving credit , but 
it does mean that the prof i tabi l i ty of revolving credit sales 
is lower than the prof i tabi l i ty of cash sales. Consequently, 
cash customers contr ibute more prof i t per sales dol lar and 
therefore pay in part for the services received by the re-
volv ing credit customer. This ^subsidy" f lows through 
prices wh ich are forced upward to maintain constant prof i t 
percentages wh i le credit sales expand. 
A companion study per formed by Professor Robert P. 
Shay of Co lumbia University and Professor Wi l l i am 
Dunkleberg of Stanford University assesses the impact 
on consumers of changes in finance charge policies. Their 
research suggests (and is supported by the work per-
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formed by Dr. Gene C. Lynch of (he University of Arkansas) 
that the cash customer belongs to, in general, the lower 
income, and/or minori ty groups that cannot quali fy for 
credit. Ironically, then, the current deficit on credit opera-
tions suggests that the poorer consumer (the cash cus-
tomer) subsidizes the better-off consumer who can quali fy 
for credit. The reason for this is that retailers cannot, by 
reason of present law, recoup the ful l amount of their 
credit costs through charges for credit services. 
The direct ion of most contemplated and recently en-
acted credit rate legislation is to increase the credit deficit 
by reducing the service charge ceil ing—now at 18 percent 
in New York State. The study shows that such changes 
wou ld tend to aggravate the present situation by causing 
a larger credit service deficit, which eventually wou ld have 
to be recovered through general price increases. This wi l l 
increase the inequity already present. 
Furthermore, in the face of an increased deficit on re-
volv ing credit services, retailers might wel l be forced to 
ration credit. Such rat ioning is made all the more likely 
because capital costs and bad debts account for 63 percent 
of total credit costs. As for the vict im of such credit ration-
ing, it is obvious he wi l l be the lower income, more risky 
account applicant—ihe person that rate regulation is in-
tended to protect. 
Another aspect of revolving credit operations that has 
been subject to heavy scrutiny by lawyers and legislators 
is the method used to compute finance charges. The 
Touche Ross study included a comparison of the revenues 
generated by six different methods. The two most fre-
quently used are the previous balance method and ad-
justed balance method, of which the former is in widest use. 
The study indicates that the adjusted balance method 
wi l l generate 84 percent of the revenues generated by the 
previous balance method at an interest rate of 1.5 percent 
per month. Hence, legislative pressure to substitute the 
adjusted balance method for the previous balance method 
wi l l have an impact similar to rate reduction legislation. 
Either it w i l l force a rat ioning of credit, which squeezes 
out the higher-risk, lower- income appl icant; or, it w i l l pass 
on a greater credit revenue/cost deficit to all consumers 
via the pricing mechanism. 
Conclusion 
There is a trend now in U.S. business toward the "unbun-
d l ing" of related services and separate pr icing for those 
services. This trend probably originated w i th the govern-
ment-init iated unbundl ing by IBM of services and hard-
ware prices dur ing the 1960 s. The trend is consistent w i th 
the "user fee" concept advocated by consumer-oriented 
economists who state that the price for a service should 
be sufficient to bear the cost of that service. This concept 
is impl ic i t in the antitrust legislation governing our busi-
ness environment. 
The separate identi f ication of revolving credit f inance 
charges is consistent wi th the unbundl ing and separate 
pr icing of credit services. However, in this case the price 
for that unbundled service is regulated and, because it is 
regulated to a level below the cost of services, inequities 
occur. 
In view of this, it appears that enl ightened legislation 
should permit the retailers to recoup, through a combina-
t ion of service charge rates and methods, the ful l costs of 
revolving credit—for the benefit of the consumer. 
Retailers Discuss 
Consumer Credit at 
Proxmire Hearings 
At a hearing on "inaccurate and un-
fair b i l l ing practices" held May 24, 
1973, before the Senate Subcommit-
tee on Consumer Credit, its chairman, 
Senator Wi l l iam Proxmire, discussed 
methods of comput ing credit w i th 
Leonard Gay of the National Home 
Furnishing Association and Michael 
Zaroya of the National Retail Mer-
chants Assocation. What fol lows is a 
condensation of their exchange on 
this subject. 
PROXMIRE: Wou ldn ' t it be better for 
the retail industry if everyone were 
on the same bi l l ing system? Then no 
one wou ld gain an unfair competi t ive 
advantage by charging lower prices 
and recove r ing revenue th rough 
some bi l l ing system that is not clearly 
understood by the customers. 
GAY: Senator, ! wou ld go back to 
what you [have] said: compet i t ion is 
the life of the business. Frankly, when 
we made our own studies between 
the difference in the previous bal-
ance and the ending balance, there 
was very l itt le difference. 
PROXMIRE: But for compet i t ion to 
be effective, the consumer has to 
know where there is a difference, 
even if it is rather modest. If the bi l l -
35 
What Is the Cost 
of Revolving Credit? 
ing system is the same, then he can 
compare the rale. 
GAY: W e are talk ing about a previous 
balance and an ending balance, and 
a daily adjusted balance. Frankly, the 
sma l l r e ta i l e r c o u l d no t poss ib ly 
handle the daily adjusted balance, as 
the giants do w i th computers. That 
leaves you two [methods w i th 1 l i t t le 
d i f ference between the two. If you 
say all of us must go to one or the 
other, any increase in cost is going to 
affect the customer in the long run. 
I urge all retailers be given the privi-
lege of using their o w n method. 
Compet i t ion is go ing to ho ld you in 
line. 
PROXMIRE: The National Commis-
sion on Consumer Finance has sug-
gested that the rate on revolving 
credi t plans be set low enough to 
avoid a subsidy to cash buyers and 
high enough to avoid a subsidy to 
credit users. W o u l d you agree? 
Z A R O Y A : W e have a g r o w i n g 
amount of data that simply says the 
present f inance charge rates do not 
cover the cost of credit programs. The 
general view by the retailer today is 
if he can approach covering his credit 
costs, that's [a l l ] he is trying to do. 
PROXMIRE: The one who gets the 
subsidy is the one who charges and 
then pays up w i th in the charge 
period. I don ' t th ink I have any 
charge accounts at all. I never charge 
a thing. So 1 don ' t get a free ride. The 
man who goes in and charges, and 
pays up, is gett ing a free ride at my 
expense. 
ZAROYA: I th ink the misconcept ion 
is we tend to think of it being two 
di f ferent customers. More of ten the 
customer opts to pay in 30 days, but 
let's say there's a coat on sale for $50, 
and it's an $f!0 coat. She can use her 
revolving charge, and take advantage 
of this account in order to effect 
much greater savings. 
PROXMIRE: What I 'm saying, how-
ever, is that the person who pays up 
w i thou t a finance charge is being 
subsidized either by the cash cus-
tomer or by the person who pays on 
a longer basis. 
ZAROYA: The impor tant th ing is that 
every customer gets that opt ion. 
PROXMIRE: Does every customer get 
a charge account? 
ZAROYA: No . . . Senator, we are 
struggling now to cover our credit 
costs w i th the revenues we are get-
ting. To go to the adjusted method 
[wou ld be] a great loss to the retailer 
who uses another method today. 
PROXMIRE: The impact on total rev-
enues w i l l not be great. Prices can al-
ways be raised to absorb the reduced 
f inance charge revenue. It seems to 
me the question boils d o w n to one 
of social policy. Are the benefits to 
the consumer in un i formi ty and sim-
plicity in b i l l ing systems, does that 
outweigh any potent ial discrimina-
tory effect imposed on cash buyers? 
Your feel ing is that the op t ion should 
be open, even though a customer 
may be confused, and may pay more 
than he thinks he is paying. 
ZAROYA: Certain retailers l ike to 
give their customers a package, and 
the management may decide that his 
package should be free delivery or 
free check-cashing — or an adjusted 
balance method on his accounts. We 
heard the chairman of the board this 
morn ing of the largest retailer in the 
country |Scars Roebuck and Co. ] say 
that they changed their method be-
cause of compet i t ive reasons. To me 
that is qui te an impor tant statement. 
PROXMIRE: You to ld me earlier that 
if you went to the adjusted balance 
system, the rate w o u l d be higher, and 
there wou ld be no way to charge a 
higher rate. What wou ld prevent the 
retai l ing industry f rom pet i t ioning the 
state legislatures for a higher rate 
based on this higher cost? 
ZAROYA: W e are worry ing about 
keeping the rates w e have. We see 
more action in legislatures in the op-
posite direct ion. 
PROXMIRE: If the adjusted balance 
system were mandated, how much of 
an increase wou ld you need in the 
rate to break even? 
ZAROYA: Generally, going f rom the 
previous balance method to the ad-
justed-balance method, it is accepted 
that there w o u l d be a reduct ion of 
f rom 16 to 20 percent. 
PROXMIRE: What is the source of 
those studies? 
ZAROYA: Studies in our o w n com-
panies, part of it was f rom a Touche 
Ross study that was made, I wou ld 
l ike to give you that later. 
PROXMIRE: Very good. One final 
question. Your general statement 
states t ha t if m i n i m u m f i nance 
charges are el iminated, small retailers 
w o u l d be forced out of the credit 
grant ing market. It was my impres-
sion that m i n i m u m f inance charges 
were employed more of ten by large 
retailers than small retailers. 
ZAROYA: If I may read the init ial 
sentence, [ i t says] the publ ic interest 
wou ld not be served by proh ib i t ing 
computat iona l methods, inc luding 
m i n i m u m charges.! think it was again 
shown this morn ing that the d i f fer -
ence between the annual percentage 
rate appl ied to the balance, and the 
m i n i m u m charge, is very small. 
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